U.S. Targets Chinese Shipping, Echoing Beijing’s Past Trade Tactics

By Briggs McCriddle, International Trade Correspondent

In April 2025, the United States unveiled a bold maritime trade policy aimed squarely at China’s shipbuilding and logistics dominance. The U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) announced it would begin charging steep fees on Chinese-built and Chinese-operated vessels docking at American ports. The plan – initiated under the Trump administration with bipartisan support – is designed to reverse Chinese dominance in global shipping and send a demand signal for U.S.-built ships. Under the new rules, any ship constructed in China, or operated by Chinese firms, will incur fees based on tonnage or containers carried, up to a set number of port calls per year. The fees start at a modest level after an initial 180-day grace period, then rise incrementally in subsequent years. Notably, ship owners can earn waivers by ordering new vessels from U.S. shipyards, an incentive to shift business to American builders.

U.S. officials cast these port charges as a defensive move to rebuild an industry seen as vital for economic and national security. The USTR’s year-long investigation found that Beijing’s heavy subsidies and strategic plans for its shipping sector were “unreasonable” practices that burden U.S. commerce. By making Chinese-linked shipping more expensive, Washington hopes to level the playing field for domestic shippers and pressure Beijing to curb its maritime industrial ambitions.

Yet even as the U.S. breaks new ground with this tariff-like port fee on foreign ships, the tactic is strikingly reminiscent of trade measures China itself has used in recent years. Beijing has a well-documented track record of leveraging tariffs, port access, and other trade restrictions as strategic tools or retaliation in diplomatic disputes. The U.S. maritime fees of 2025 can be seen as a turn of the tables – borrowing from a playbook that China has employed against a range of countries. Below, we examine several historical cases where China imposed high tariffs, port hurdles, and import bans in pursuit of strategic aims, and how those actions parallel the current U.S. approach.

Beijing’s Track Record of Retaliatory Trade Measures

China’s rise as a trading power has been accompanied by a series of punitive trade actions directed at other nations when political disputes flare. Often couched in technical terms – such as anti-dumping rulings or health and safety concerns – these measures frequently coincide with moments of diplomatic friction, making their strategic intent clear. From steep tariffs on commodities to sudden customs holdups at ports, Beijing has repeatedly shown it is willing to weaponize trade to defend its interests. Key examples span multiple sectors and countries:

Australia’s Exports – Tariffs Amid a Diplomatic Rift:

In 2020, after Australia called for an independent investigation into the origins of COVID-19, China swiftly unleashed a barrage of trade restrictions. It imposed crushing tariffs on Australian barley and wine, ostensibly over dumping allegations, and unofficially halted imports of other goods like coal, lobsters, beef, and timber. At the height of the standoff, shipments of Australian coal were left stranded off Chinese ports. By choking off coal and levying punitive duties on farm goods, China sent a clear message after Australia’s political stance upset Beijing. Over time, China began easing these import curbs as diplomatic dialogue improved.

Tit-for-Tat Tariffs in the U.S.–China Trade War:

When the United States first imposed tariffs on Chinese products in 2018, China responded in kind. Washington’s initial tariffs on Chinese high-tech goods were quickly met with equal tariffs on U.S. exports, targeting politically sensitive products like soybeans and automobiles. The tariff duel—each side raising import taxes—contributed to a significant chilling of bilateral commerce and higher global costs. The current U.S. port fees on Chinese ships mirror this pattern, using trade costs as a form of leverage.

Europe’s Ordeal – From Lithuanian Blockade to Norwegian Salmon:

Lithuania, in 2021, faced an unprecedented trade blockade from China after deepening ties with Taiwan. Chinese customs halted imports, delisted Lithuania from origin databases, and indirectly affected EU companies using Lithuanian components. Similarly, after the 2010 Nobel Peace Prize was awarded to a Chinese dissident, Norway’s salmon trade collapsed as China imposed opaque health checks and delays, effectively banning imports. These cases highlight how China uses technical barriers and informal restrictions to exert economic pressure.

Japan’s Rare Earth Shock:

In 2010, after a maritime incident with Japan, China halted rare earth exports to Japanese industries critical for technology manufacturing. Though never formally announced, the embargo caused prices to spike and pushed Japan to diversify its rare earth sources. More recently, China has implemented new controls on strategic minerals, signaling its continued use of export dominance as leverage.

South Korea – Tourism and Business as Pressure Points:

In 2017, China responded to South Korea’s deployment of a U.S. missile defense system by shuttering Lotte Group stores and banning Chinese tourists from traveling to Korea. Korean cultural exports were pulled from platforms, and the economic impact was severe. These informal sanctions exemplify how Beijing wields consumer behavior and regulatory enforcement as retaliatory tools.

Strategic Parallels and Global Implications

There is an ironic symmetry in today’s trade environment. The United States is now adopting strategic trade tools reminiscent of China’s past tactics. By imposing port fees and contemplating further tariffs on Chinese port equipment, Washington is signaling that access to the U.S. market can be conditioned on strategic behavior—much like China has done with its own trade partners.

The parallels are stark. Both countries use economic interdependence as leverage, design penalties to appear technically compliant with international law, and offer off-ramps for compliance or reconciliation. This shift from globalist free-trade ideals to transactional strategic trade signals a new era where tariffs and regulations are instruments of national policy.

The global consequences could be significant. With both the U.S. and China weaponizing trade, smaller countries may face growing pressure to align with one camp or another. Supply chains could fragment further. While these actions may address security concerns and support domestic industries, they also carry risks of retaliation, economic volatility, and inflationary pressures across sectors.

In the maritime sector, the U.S. fees on Chinese-built ships could recalibrate freight flows, insurance costs, and shipbuilding decisions. Other countries may adopt similar measures, leading to a more segmented and politicized global shipping market.

Ultimately, ports, tariffs, and vessel access are now tools of statecraft. The United States, by targeting Chinese shipbuilding and logistics, is not just enacting economic policy—it is engaging in strategic competition. And as both nations continue to trade economic blows, the world is left to navigate a more turbulent and transactional trade landscape.